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NEW JERSEY CREATES A NEW "SEMI-
PUBLIC FIGURE" IN DEFAMATION
ACTIONS: SISLER v. GANNETT CO., INC.
Since the trial of John Peter Zenger,1 American courts have
struggled with the scope of a publisher's liability for false and de-
famatory statements.2 For more than two centuries, the matter was
left largely to the states,3 which often imposed a standard of strict
' See Attorney General v. Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 675 (cited in C.
LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL xvi-ii (1981)); LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 43-61 (1966). Zenger's 1735 trial for defamation of the governor
of New York is deemed a turning point in American libel law in that the jury ignored the
judge's instructions that publication of criticism was defamation as a matter of law; instead,
the jurors took it upon themselves to acquit Zenger based on his defense of truth. See C.
LAWHORNE, supra, at xvi-ii.
2 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 111-12, at 771-97 (5th ed. 1984).
"[D]efamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name." Id. at 771. It
includes two forms of action: slander (an oral defamatory statement) and libel (defamatory
statements that are written or otherwise expressed in some physical format, such as movies,
signs, or pictures). Id. at 785-87. English courts adopted a further distinction between the
two forms: in an action for slander, injury to the plaintiff's good name had to be specifically
proven before damages were awarded. Id. at 795. Libel, however, was actionable per se and
damages could be awarded for the presumed harm to the plaintiff's reputation. Id. This was
also the position held by most American courts until Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). See infra note 9. See also Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel per Quod, 79
HAv. L. REv. 733 (1966) (discussion of anomaly of libel per quod, requiring proof of injury).
In early common law cases, truth was a complete defense to an action for defamation.
See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1353 n.16 (1975). The burden of proving
the truth of a defamatory statement was on the defendant; the plaintiff did not have to
show falsity, only publication. Id. at 1353. The Supreme Court has recently vacated that
long-standing assumption. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. -, 106
S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986) (burden of proving falsity is on plaintiff).
3 See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 393-94 (1798) (circuit court ruling
that federal prosecution of common law crimes was illegal); see also United States v. Hud-
son and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), discussed in C. LAWHORNE, supra note 1, at
3-4 (Supreme Court, in its first libel decision, declared it had no criminal jurisdiction over
common law cases). Moreover, since the Bill of Rights did not constrain the individual
states, see Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 246 (1833), the Supreme
Court retained limited jurisdiction in civil actions for libel. C. LAWHORNE, supra note 1, at 5.
It was not until the twentieth century that the Supreme Court concluded that certain fun-
damental rights, including freedom of speech and of the press, are guaranteed to all citizens
through the mechanism of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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liability.4 In 1964, however, the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan5 introduced a constitutional dimension to
the question, holding that the first and fourteenth amendments
protected criticism of public officials in their official conduct.' In
such a case damages could only be awarded by proof of the defend-
ant's "actual malice."7 A decade later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.," the Court decreed that in actions where the plaintiff was a
4 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 113, at 808-10 (English
courts held defendants liable in defamation actions without regard to any question of negli-
gence). The rationale for strict liability is based on two assumptions. First, there would have
been no defamation without some negligence on the part of the publisher. Eaton, supra note
2, at 1359. Second, since media dissemination is likely to cause widespread harm, "enter-
prise liability" dictates that the publisher insure against the risk of that harm and, if neces-
sary, pass on its costs through advertising and subscription rates. Id.
- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Id. at 283. In New York Times, a Montgomery, Alabama, city commissioner alleged
that he had been defamed by an advertisement appearing in the New York Times on March
29, 1960, which had mistakenly claimed that the Montgomery police had surrounded a col-
lege campus, padlocked the student dining hall during a peaceful civil rights demonstration,
and been responsible for having arrested Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. seven times. See id. at
256-58. Although the advertisement did not mention Sullivan by name, he contended he had
been libeled because he was the commissioner in charge of supervising the city police. Id. at
258.
A state trial court awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages and the Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed. Id. at 256. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the
Constitution constrained the states' power to punish defamation of public officials. See id.
at 292.
The Court declined to delineate the parameters of "official conduct." See id. at 283
n.23. It also refused to specify which governmental employees would fit into the category of
"public official." See id. But see Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (public official is
government employee who has "substantial responsibility for or control over . . . govern-
mental affairs"); see also Eaton, supra note 2, at 1377 (lower courts soon turned public
official category into "government affiliation" test). The Supreme Court later extended the
protections and requirements of New York Times to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (university football coach held to be public figure by
reason of position alone).
In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), one commentator has argued that the constitutional
guidelines now used in defamation cases may be subsumed into a more general analysis
applicable to all first amendment free speech issues. Note, The De-Constitutionalization of
Defamation Law-Is It Really That Far Off?., 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 279 (1986).
7 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283. Early common law defined malice as spite or ill-
will. Eaton, supra note 2, at 1353, n.15. Writing for a unanimous Court in New York Times,
however, Justice Brennan defined actual malice as "knowledge that [the statement] was
false or ... reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S. at
280. The Court refined this definition somewhat in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968) (recklessness must be proven by "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication").
8 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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private individual, the states were free to impose any standard of
fault, so long as it was not strict liability.9 As the Supreme Court
has delineated the constitutional limits to freedom of expression,1°
states have slowly moved from their pre-Gertz position of strict
liability1 to an ever-increasing protection of the media. 2 Although
states addressing the issue in terms of the plaintiff's status have
thus far elected a variety of standards, all have employed the
Gertz criteria for distinguishing public figures from private indi-
viduals. 3 Recently, in Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc.,4 New Jersey be-
" See id. at 352. Elmer Gertz was a Chicago attorney retained to represent the family of
a youth killed by a policeman in a civil action against the officer. Id. at 325. The defendant's
magazine, American Opinion, falsely labeled Gertz as the architect of a "frame up" in con-
nection with the criminal prosecution of the officer. Id. at 325-26. The article also alleged
that Gertz had a criminal record and was a "Communist-fronter." Id. at 326.
The Supreme Court ruled that, in an action for defamation, the New York Times actual
malice burden of proof need not be met by an individual who was neither a public official
nor a public figure. See id. at 352. The Court distinguished between public and private
figures on two bases. See id. at 344. First, public figures enjoy much greater access to the
media and therefore have a greater opportunity to correct false statements. Id. Second, the
public figure has voluntarily placed himself in the middle of a public controversy in order to
influence its outcome. Id. at 344-45. Neither criterion can be applied to a private individual,
and thus the states retain a significant interest in promoting a legal remedy for defamation
of a private individual. Id. at 345-46.
In a vehement dissent, Justice White objected to the abolition of the strict liability
standard, arguing that it abrogated the common law in all or nearly all of the states and
could not be justified as an intent of the original framers of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 370,
380 (White, J., dissenting).
10 See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (publicity re-
ceived in light of individual's failure to appear before grand jury did not render him a public
figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (scientist who had no special promi-
nence or access to the media deemed not to be a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976) (wife of wealthy industrialist not a public figure because neither of Gertz
public figure criteria met).
" See Comment, Defamation and State Constitutions: The Search for a State Law
Based Standard after Gertz, 19 WMLAMErrE L. REV. 665 (1983); Note, supra note 6.
12 See generally Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (private individual can recover in defamation action
only by showing gross negligence on part of newspaper); The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va.
1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) (where statement is defamatory on its
face and plaintiff is private individual, ordinary negligence prevails). For a recent compila-
tion of cases, categorized by fault standard, see Annotation, State Constitutional Protection
of Allegedly Defamatory Statements Regarding Private Individuals, 33 A.L.R.4th 212
(1986); see also LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, FIFTY STATE SURVEY 1985-86 (1986)
(state-by-state outline of defamation law).
,3 See B. SANFORD, LmR.L AND PRIVACY. THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION §
7.2.2 (1985). However, in Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications,
Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals discussed the Gertz distinction, but rejected the notion of distinguish-
ing among libel plaintiffs. See id. at 679, 321 N.E.2d at 588. The court established an actual
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came the latest state to broaden the ambit of protection offered to
the press beyond what the first amendment requires. In Sisler, the
New Jersey Supreme Court imposed the actual malice burden on
an individual who, while admittedly not a public figure by consti-
tutional standards, was nevertheless a knowledgeable and exper-
ienced person who could have foreseen the risk of publicity engen-
dered by his private transactions. 15
The plaintiff in Sisler was one of the founders and former
president of the Franklin State Bank.16 Soon after he retired,
Sisler obtained from the bank substantial loans for another busi-
ness, a horse breeding farm.' 7 In 1981, in a series of articles detail-
ing a federal investigation into the bank's questionable loan prac-
tices," the defendant's newspaper, The Courier-News, erroneously
reported that Sisler's loans had been undercollateralized. 9 In
Sisler's subsequent defamation suit, the appellate division affirmed
the trial judge's conclusion that Sisler was a private figure,20 and
malice standard of liability for all defamation plaintiffs, provided only that the subject mat-
ter involved an event of general or public interest. See id. at 677, 321 N.E.2d at 586. The
court rejected the assumption that private individuals are any more deserving of state pro-
tection of their reputations than are public figures, see id. at 679, 321 N.E.2d at 588, and
quoted approvingly from the pre-Gertz case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 385, 388 (1967):
"Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community." 162 Ind. App. at 679, 321 N.E.2d at 588. The Indiana court expressly adopted
the plurality opinion in another pre-Gertz case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971) (New York Times privilege extends to all publications on matters of public inter-
est, regardless of plaintiffs' status). See 162 Ind. App. at 681, 321 N.E.2d at 590. The Su-
preme Court abandoned the Rosenbloom rationale in Gertz. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346
(1974).
104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083 (1986).
See id. at 279, 516 A.2d at 1095.
Id. at 259. 516 A.2d at 1085.
17 Id. at 260, 516 A.2d at 1085.
11 Id. The articles appeared on August 15, 19, and 20, 1981. The first story recounted
the investigation of the bank, but did not mention the plaintiff. Id. Sisler's only objection to
the second story was the word "ties" in the headline, "Bank officials have ties with firm in
loan probe." Id. Sisler's primary claim of defamation arose from the third article which
misstated the facts of his own loan. Id.
19 Id. at 260, 516 A.2d at 1085. At the time that the articles were published, Sisler was
negotiating to have three of the top breeding horses of the season stand stud at his farm. Id.
The articles were anonymously mailed to the horse syndicator with whom Sisler was deal-
ing, and negotiations were immediately terminated. Id. at 261, 516 A.2d at 1085. These
losses formed the basis of Sisler's claims for actual and special damages. Id. at 280-82, 516
A. 2d at 1096. Although the question of damages was the subject of several secondary issues
on appeal, id. at 279-85, 516 A.2d at 1095-98, this Comment is limited to a discussion of the
primary focus of the case, the proper burden of proof.
20 See 199 N.J. Super. 307, 312 (1985).
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therefore subject to a lesser burden of proof than actual malice.21
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while conceding that
Sisler did not meet the Supreme Court's criteria for a public fig-
ure, 22 nevertheless relied on the state's common law tradition of
vigorous support of freedom of the press to subject Sisler to the
more stringent actual malice standard. 3
In Sisler, the court discussed two criteria developed by the Su-
preme Court in deciding libel cases: the plaintiff's status and the
nature of the speech involved.24 The Sisler court first concluded
that an on-going federal investigation of a bank was a matter of
legitimate public concern. 5 In examining Sisler's status, the court
admitted that he was not a first amendment public figure.26 The
court, however, also found that federal law in this area did not to-
tally supplant state law,27 and that New Jersey's demonstrated
commitment to free speech 28 dictated that the courts make a case-
21 See id. at 315-16. The appellate division of the state superior court reached this con-
clusion by examining Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing, Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d
469, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982). In Lawrence, the state's highest court had carefully
analyzed the plaintiffs' status, concluded that they were "limited purpose public figures"
under Gertz, and imposed an actual malice standard. See id. at 465, 446 A.2d at 477. The
intermediate appellate court in Sisler reasoned that there would have been no need for this
analysis unless a private figure were to be subject to proving a lesser standard of fault. See
Sisler, 199 N.J. Super. at 313. The court also noted that the overwhelming majority of the
states addressing the issue since Gertz had adopted an ordinary negligence standard, and
held that negligence was also the proper standard for a private individual against a media
defendant in New Jersey. See id. at 315-16.
22 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 275, 516 A.2d at 1093.
22 See id. at 271-72, 516 A.2d at 1091. In a case decided the same day as Sisler, the New
Jersey Supreme Court also refused to apply the label "public figure" to a corporation whose
product was the subject of defamatory statements. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub-
lishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 145, 516 A.2d 220, 228 (1986). In Dairy Stores, the-court held the
corporation to establishing proof of the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard for truth or falsity. See id. at 150, 516 A.2d at 233.
24 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 265-69, 516 A.2d at 1088-89.
25 See id. at 268, 516 A.2d at 1089. In particular, the court noted that its decision with
regard to the public issue prong of the actual malice test was based largely on the extensive
federal and state regulation of banking, with its special guidelines for a bank's loans to its
executive officers. See id.
20 See id. at 270, 516 A.2d at 1090. Writing for the majority, Justice Handler declared
that the lower courts were correct in ruling that Sisler was not a first amendment public
figure because he had neither attained special prominence nor voluntarily sought the pub-
lic's attention on this issue. See id.
17 See id. at 270-72, 516 A.2d at 1090-91.
2 Id. at 272, 516 A.2d at 1091. The New Jersey Constitution provides:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for
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by-case assessment of the equity of imposing the actual malice
burden of proof.2 Here the majority found that, although Sisler
had not sought publicity, he was nonetheless a sophisticated busi-
ness executive who should have known that his loan transactions
would elicit public scrutiny." Justice Handler reasoned that, be-
cause of Sisler's participation in a matter of legitimate public con-
cern, it was not inequitable for the court to subjugate his individ-
ual reputational concerns to the interests of free speech by
imposing a stricter burden of proof upon the plaintiff." The court
further justified this holding by enumerating problems it perceived
in the negligence standard of liability and dismissing the use of
expert testimony as ineffective. 2
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the
jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good mo-
tives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the fact.
N.J. CONsT. art. I, 1 6. The Sisler court noted that the New Jersey Legislature's enactment
of the Shield Law, see infra note 62, was evidence of a strong state commitment to free
-ueech. See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 271, 516 A.2d at 1091. Recent decisions had, in turn, inter-
preted both the state constitution and this statute to effect a wider protection of public
debate on public issues. Id.
29 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 274, 516 A.2d at 1092. This same fairness to the individual,
the court reasoned, was implied from the state common law decisions regarding the quali-
fied privilege of "fair comment." See id. at 272, 516 A.2d at 1091. New Jersey defines the
privilege as protection of even false ideas where the statements are honest expressions of
actual opinion, imply no dishonorable motive other than the one stated, and are based on
true facts. See Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 254-55, 131 A.2d 781, 789 (1957). The majority in
Sisler also pointed to Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982),
as an example of "fair comment protection to speech regarding individuals who had as-
sumed the risks of publicity." See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 272, 516 A.2d at 1091. However, it is
submitted that Kotlikoff applied federal constitutional standards. See Kotlikoff, 89 N.J. at
68, 444 A.2d at 1092 (1982) ("fair comment" privilege obsolete after Gertz). See generally
Note, Fact and Opinion after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34
RUTGERS L. REv. 81 (1981) (discussing elements of fair comment privilege and impact of
Supreme Court decisions).
"o See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 275, 516 A.2d at 1093. The court admitted that Sisler had not
voluntarily sought publicity, and yet it contended that most business people would expect a
large "insider" loan to engender legitimate public scrutiny. See id. On this basis, the court
found that Sisler had "relinquished part of his reputation to the public eye." Id. at 274, 516
A.2d at 1093.
31 See id. at 275, 516 A.2d at 1093.
32 See id. at 276-79, 516 A.2d at 1093-95. The court feared that an ordinary negligence
standard in the area of libel would serve only to promote censorship in that its unpredict-
able application would force a publisher to steer clear of topics involving private individuals.
See id. at 276-78, 516 A.2d at 1093-94. Moreover, the court stated that this standard had
great potential for use as a weapon to punish unpopular speakers and notions. See id. A
standard of gross negligence had the same flaws, the majority asserted, and was useful where
the jury had to assess ordinary human behavior, but not helpful in the context of defama-
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Although concurring in the majority's order to remand the
case, Justice Garibaldi argued against the imposition of the actual
malice standard for several reasons."3 The concurrence posited that
the application of this standard struck an improper balance be-
tween the competing claims of a free press and the private individ-
ual by leaving the latter with no practical avenue of redress for
defamation.3 4 Second, in Justice Garibaldi's view, Sisler had done
nothing to surrender any part of his reputation to public scru-
tiny. 5 Third, the creation of what Justice Garibaldi termed a
"semi-public figure" would potentially affect many executives of
high profile corporations and further confuse an already befuddled
area of the law.3 6 The concurrence suggested instead that the
proper burden to be imposed on a private individual would be
proof of professional negligence, ascertainable with recourse to the
level of care required of the reasonably prudent media defendant.3 7
The concern for the public interest nature of speech evidenced
throughout the Sisler38 opinion is consistent with recent Supreme
Court cases emphasizing the importance of the content of speech
in libel actions.3 9 It is suggested, however, that to effectuate that
tion. See id. at 278, 516 A.2d at 1094.
The court also commented that expert testimony might be useful only where the issues
were unusual and complex, but that such testimony could not solve the problems of jury
variance and press self-censorship inherent in either negligence standard. See id. at 278-79,
516 A.2d at 1095.
11 See id. at 285-97, 516 A.2d at 1098-1104 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Indeed, remand
was the only point on which Justice Garibaldi agreed with the majority. See infra notes 34-
37 and accompanying text.
S4 See id. at 285-87, 516 A.2d at 1098-99 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi
accused the majority of resurrecting the Rosenbloom rationale. See id. at 288, 516 A.2d at
1100 (Garibaldi, J., concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
See Sister at 290-91, 516 A.2d at 1101 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
" See id. at 291-92, 516 A.2d at 1101-02 (Garibaldi, J. concurring). In addition, Justice
Garibaldi asserted, the majority's holding would have made "semi-public figures" of the pri-
vate individuals in several Supreme Court libel cases. See id. at 291, 516 A.2d at 1101-02
(Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi also predicted that the lack of any specific cri-
teria for the new category would only serve to promote second-guessing of the majority's
intent. See id. at 291-92, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). The concurrence as-
serted that the court imposed the stricter standard of proof on Sisler solely because the
majority was concerned with protecting speech on a matter of public interest. See id. at 291,
516 A.2d at 1101 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
"' See id. at 293-94, 516 A.2d at 1102-03 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). The key factors in
assessing the level of care required of a professional would be the paper's size, financial and
technical resources, and the period of time reasonably allotted to verification, given the
pressures of deadline and topicality. Id. (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
" See id. at 263-75, 516 A.2d at 1087-92.
" See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1564
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concern, the New Jersey court has in essence created a third cate-
gory of plaintiffs in defamation actions. It is submitted that such a
path is fraught with uncertainties both for potential plaintiffs and
for lower state courts. Further, the New Jersey court ignored sev-
eral possible intermediate protections which would have properly
balanced the rights and expectations of both parties in a defama-
tion suit.
THE "SEMI-PUBLIC FIGURE": A PROBLEMATIC APPROACH
In the decade after New York Times, the Supreme Court be-
gan to refine its classification of defamation plaintiffs.40 While the
Gertz Court reaffirmed that both public officials and public figures
had to prove actual malice to recover in a defamation suit against a
media defendant,4' it allowed the states to fix their own standard
of liability where the plaintiff was a private person.42 Despite its
recent focus on the content of the speech, the Supreme Court has
nevertheless continued to employ its public figure-private person
dichotomy.48 It is entirely within this framework that the Supreme
Court has invited states to set the level of fault necessary for re-
covery of actual damages by a private individual.44 The court in
(1986) (where case involves private figure and public issue, Constitution requires balance be
struck in favor of protecting speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (communication on matters of public concern is entitled to spe-
cial protection).
40 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 385 (1967); supra note 10.
" See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; see also Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel:
A Concept in Search of a Definition, 33 Bus. LAW. 709, 712 (1978); Note, General Public
Figures Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 355, 379-80 (1984) (limited
public figure approach). See generally Note, Determination of Public Figure Status in Li-
bel Actions, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 204, 205-07 (1982) (collection of cases and articles on
topic).
42 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. The broad area of discretion returned to the states had
two significant limitations. The first was that strict liability could not be imposed. Id. The
second constraint was that, regardless of the burden of proof used to recover actual dam-
ages, presumed and punitive damages could not be awarded without proof of actual malice.
Id. at 350.
43 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1562-63
(1986) (first amendment requires examination of whether speech is of public concern and
whether plaintiff is public or private figure).
" See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(states may permit recovery of presumed and punitive damages on showing of less than
actual malice where plaintiff is private individual and speech does not involve matter of
public concern).
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Sisler utilized the language of the Supreme Court in its analysis.
Ultimately, however, the court went beyond the Supreme Court
guidelines 4" and chose instead to impose the actual malice burden
of a public figure on a private individual who, while not thrusting
himself voluntarily into public controversy,4s should, in the court's
view, have expected that his private transactions might become a
matter of public concern.4 7 The court found that New Jersey com-
mon law provided a rationale for preferring free speech over the
reputational interests of at least some private persons. 48 It is sug-
gested that the majority's holding is tantamount to creating a new
type of defamation plaintiff, the "semi-public figure," 49 and that
such an ambiguous concept unnecessarily muddies the already
turbid waters of libel cases.50
While the court's underlying rationale of fostering a free press
is laudatory, it could have accomplished the same end more clearly
and efficaciously, as a few other states have done,51 by extending
the actual malice standard to any private individual, in line with
the Supreme Court's framing of the choice.52 At a minimum, this
path would have had the salutary effect of obviating ad hoc judi-
cial decisions, with their attendant unpredictability, on the status
4' See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Supreme Court in Gertz distinguished private
individuals from public figures in that the latter (1) enjoy greater access to the media to
rebut false statements and (2) ifivite comment by having voluntarily thrust themselves into
public controversies in order to influence their outcome. See id. More recently, the Court
has reiterated that the Gertz criteria are applicable to defamation plaintiffs where the
speech involves a matter of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757-58.
" See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 269-70, 516 A.2d at 1090. The court candidly admitted that
"[p]laintiff has not attained 'especial prominence'. . . nor. .. 'thrust [himself] to the fore-
front of particular public controversies' . . . Plaintiff does not command 'a substantial
amount of independent public interest'... [or] 'pervasive fame or notoriety'... even in the
Franklin Township area." Id. (citations omitted).
'7 See id. at 275, 516 A.2d at 1093.
" See id. at 272-73, 516 A.2d at 1091-92.
"' See id. at 291-92, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
50 See id. at 291, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring); Eaton, supra note 2, at
1449-50.
" See, e.g., Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (D. Alaska 1979) (actual malice
standard extended to all defamation plaintiffs based on pre-Gertz common law); Aafco
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 677, 321
N.E.2d 580, 587 (1974) (actual malice applied in all issues of public concern regardless of
status of plaintiff), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 421
Mich. 125, 136-37, 364 N.W.2d 600, 606 (1984) (actual malice burden imposed on private
figure in suit against media defendant).
02 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
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of any plaintiff.53 Moreover, it is suggested that treating any exper-
ienced and knowledgeable individual as such a public figure may
ultimately raise due process questions. Since such a category, as
the concurrence points out, arguably includes many executives in a
number of businesses, 4 it is questionable whether either private
individuals or the media will have sufficient notice of the potential
classification of any heretofore private person.55 Additionally, it is
not clear from the decision at what point a truly private person
becomes subject to the burden of proof of a public figure.56 The
court did not specifically indicate whether it was by virtue of the
individual's business status, the nature of the transaction, or by a
confluence of both that Sisler was eventually deemed to have relin-
quished part of his reputation to the public eye.57
ALTERNATIVE SAFEGUARDS FOR BOTH PARTIES
Even conceding the New Jersey Supreme Court's contention
that Sisler was a sophisticated and knowledgeable businessperson
whose interests should not supersede those of the press,5 8 there are
several other safeguards, less damaging to the interests of private
persons, which nevertheless allow the press "breathing space."5 9
One such safeguard suggested by Justice Garibaldi would maintain
the constitutional guidelines for distinguishing between public and
53 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 291-92, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Although
the imposition of the actual malice standard on private individuals may have been impliedly
discouraged by the Supreme Court in its Gertz retraction of the Rosenbloom rationale, it is
to be noted that thus far, the Court has denied certiorari in the only such case to seek a
Supreme Court hearing, Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975).
" See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 291, 516 A.2d at 1101 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
5 For a related discussion of the possible due process problems involved in ascertaining
what is a public issue, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases: Constitu-
tional Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 220-21 (1985).
11 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 279, 516 A.2d at 1095. This holding is, at best, ambiguous. On
the one hand, the majority may mean that a private person engaging in a private transaction
remains private unless and until his fipancial affairs come under public scrutiny; then he is a
public figure. It is submitted that this reasoning is tautological. On the other hand, the court
may be implying that such a private person becomes a public figure at the time he enters
into the transaction. It is suggested that this interpretation is Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979) (defendant cannot make plaintiff a public figure merely by subject-
ing him to public scrutiny), turned on its head.
17 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 275-76, 516 A.2d at 1093. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (in libel cases court looks to plaintiff's position and prior activities
to determine appropriate degree of judicial protection).
" See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 275, 516 A.2d at 1093.
" See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
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private figures, and instead subject the press to a kind of profes-
sional negligence test.e0 In her view, such a standard could be ob-
jectively verified by recourse to the usual standards of responsible
journalists of similar resources."1 It is suggested that such a test is
a much more reasonable burden for a private person to carry in a
state where a strong "shield law" 2 makes it exceedingly difficult to
obtain, through pre-trial discovery, objective proof of the defend-
ant's state of mind, as required by the actual malice burden of
proof."
Finally, it is suggested that the Sisler court, in rejecting a neg-
ligence or gross negligence standard, overlooked two other corol-
lary safeguards which would effectuate these standards-the evi-
dentiary burden and the scope of review. In the first instance, the
majority could have required lower courts to impose on the private
plaintiff an evidentiary burden of clear and convincing proof of
any lesser standard of liability than actual malice, both at the sum-
mary judgment stage and for the jury's verdict. 4 This more strin-
gent standard would ensure both parties a more reasonable chance
of airing only valid complaints. In regard to the scope of review in
libel cases, the Supreme Court has encouraged de novo review of
all the findings of a trial court. 5 It is submitted that the mandat-
60 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 293-94, 516 A.2d at 1102-03 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice
Garibaldi wrote that "a reasonably-prudent-media-defendant standard would have little, if
any, practical effect on the functioning of responsible journalism." Id. at 294, 516 A.2d 1103
(Garibaldi, J., concurring).
11 See id. at 293-94, 516 A.2d at 1102-03 (Garibaldi, J., concurring) (quoting L. TRIE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 312-13, at 646-47 (1978)).
62 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976) (newspaper employee has privilege
to refuse to disclose source of information); see also Note, The Triumph of the Press: New
Jersey Departs from Federal Trends in Libel Law, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 91 passim (1983)
(state shield law creates absolute privilege in civil action for libel).
13 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160-77 (1979). But see Oakes, Proof of Actual
Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 655, 666 (1979)
(suggesting actual malice may be proven circumstantially or inferentially).
", See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 293, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). It is uncer-
tain whether this is the evidentiary burden proposed by Justice Garibaldi when she sug-
gested allowing recovery on a "clear preponderance." Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512-14 (1986) (plaintiff must furnish clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice to avoid summary judgment). It is submitted that a clear and convincing bur-
den of proof throughout the proceedings might result in more defendants winning at the
summary judgment stage, even with a negligence standard. It might also avoid discovery
problems. See supra note 63.
" See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505-11
(1984) (appellate courts must use independent judgment in reviewing whether actual malice
was established with proof of convincing clarity).
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ing of de novo review by the New Jersey Supreme Court would
provide defendants with an effective weapon on appeal, while still
protecting the private individual's legitimate interest in clearing
his reputation at trial.6
CONCLUSION
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Sisler v. Gannett
Co., Inc. substantially departs from the established method for de-
fining the status of a plaintiff in a defamation suit. As it stands
now, New Jersey has, on the one hand, an amorphous category of
semi-public figures subject to an actual malice standard of proof
and, on the other hand, a still undefined class of truly private per-
sons subject to an as-yet unannounced burden of proof. Lower
courts must now resolve on an ad hoc basis the public-private fig-
ure dichotomy without definite guidelines as to the boundaries of
either category. This Comment has suggested that alternative ap-
proaches with stricter procedural safeguards would provide a more
enlightening and efficacious solution.
Helen W. George
06 See Sisler, 104 N.J. at 293, 516 A.2d at 1102 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). See also
Comment, supra note 11, at 693 (urging adoption of negligence standard as protecting free
speech and citizens' reputational concerns).
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